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Abstract
I am concerned in this paper with McDowell's account of human uniqueness in
nature in terms of a fundamental difference between humans and animals. I try to
show that the concept of that difference is relevant for a Wittgensteinian
understanding of the place of rationality in nature. I then develop an internal
criticism of McDowell's transcendental way of approaching this topic by using
Diamond's insights about the importance of the details for a realistic philosophical
account of human mindedness. My aim is to show that the difference between
humans and animals is constitutive of our understanding of what it means to be
humans, but this is not something we can explain in advance of looking at the
weave of our life with them.

Essay
It is not uncommon among philosophers to say that humans and
animals have a different kind of mindedness. What they mean is that,
even if we are right in acknowledging animals as self-moving and
responsive to features of their environment, only human beings can
be properly said reflective speaking beings. As we may put it, we
share with animals a perceptual sensitivity to the environment, and
differ from them in our rationality. Thus, for example, both humans
and animals can feel a pain, but only a human being can tell to others
how that pain occurred. This fact has been acknowledged as a part of
the problem of finding the place of reason in nature. Indeed, it is very
difficult to spell out the peculiarity of the human condition, and even
more to assess its relevance to our ethical commitments towards
animals. So the disagreement among philosophers is about how to
understand and assess the idea of a human uniqueness in nature.
I'll be concerned in this paper with John McDowell's original
account of this topic, as it figures in his Mind and World. McDowell
offers a conception of human mindedness that allows us to make
sense of the question about the human uniqueness in nature out of

119

the Cartesian framework in which it is often asked. But I think it is
important to see how McDowell arrives at facing the humans-animals
distinction and the role it plays in the structure of his book. This will
give me the occasion to develop some critical evaluations of
McDowell's method concerning (what I take to be) a tension between
his philosophical quietism and the kind of generality he is aiming at.
This is also intended as an illustration of the importance of the
starting-point for philosophical reflection on humans and animals.
I will begin by briefly sketching the overall topic of Mind and
World. In those lectures, McDowell aims at uprooting the persistence
of a dualistic picture of the relation between mind and world that
gives rise to familiar anxieties about the nature of that relation and of
its components. In general, this picture is historically identified
within the post-Cartesian tradition, according to which the mind is
separated from reality, reason from nature, and norms from facts. In
McDowell's exposition, the anxiety takes the form of an oscillation
between two exclusive and opposed philosophical positions, the Myth
of the Given and the Coherentism. The dialectic of the oscillation
arises in the context of a reflection about the world-directedness of
thought, about, that is, the idea that the relation between thought and
reality must be a normative one. This relation is normative if our
judgments and beliefs are answerable to how things are in the world,
so that they can be correct or incorrect according to whether or not
things are thus and so. This is the idea Quine famously expressed
through the metaphor of a “tribunal of experience”. But, as McDowell
notices, the idea of experience as a tribunal became problematic since
the modern scientific revolution, which “made possible a newly clear
conception of the distinctive kind of intelligibility that the natural
sciences allow us to find in things” (McDowell 1994, XX). The point is
that we have to “sharply distinguish natural-scientific intelligibility
from the kind of intelligibility something acquires when we situate it
in the logical space of reason” (McDowell 1994, XX). That is to say,
we have to acknowledge a dichotomy of logical spaces, a difference in
kind between concepts we employ when we locate something in a
normative context (the space of reasons), and concepts we use in an
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empirical description in order to situate something into the realm of
law. The dichotomy of logical spaces, a distinction McDowell doesn't
want to refute, may lead us in misleadingly identifying the natural
with the realm of law. But in this way experience, conceived as “made
up of impressions, impingements by the world on a possessor of
sensory capacities” (McDowell 1994, XV), that is, as an essentially
natural transaction, must be something that belongs to the realm of
law. The conception of experience as mere impressions is that of the
Myth of Given. The oscillation begins precisely when we feel
ourselves forced to answer the question: How is it possible for
experience to be a tribunal, if it is constituted by mere impressions?
The Myth of the Given side of the oscillation moves from the idea
of an interface between our conceptual powers and the external
world, so that our conceptual powers cannot reach all the way to the
objects themselves. In this way, we feel the need for something like a
warrant for our free and spontaneous exercises of concepts to not
being a “self-contained game” (McDowell 1994, 5). In other words,
we ask for a ground for the world-directedness of thought, something
that can make experience intelligible in terms of answerability to a
tribunal. According to this picture, the objectivity of our (empirical)
thought depends on the possibility of finding a link between our
exercises of concepts and the external reality. So, as a response to the
worry about the possibility for our thought to be in touch with reality,
the Myth of the Given offers a position according to which we can
“acknowledge an external constraint on our freedom to deploy our
empirical concepts” (McDowell 1994, 6) by grounding empirical
justifications on impingements on the conceptual realm from outside.
As McDowell puts it:
The idea is that when we have exhausted all the available
moves within the space of concepts, all the available
moves from one conceptually organized item to another,
there is still one more step we can take: namely, pointing
to something that is simply received in experience
(McDowell 1994, 6).
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The Myth of the Given conceives external constraints to the
spontaneous exercises of concepts as brute impacts from the exterior,
mere presences that are received in the space of concepts. But, as we
so far have seen, if constraints are to be conceived as justifications for
our empirical thought, we need rational constraints, and mere
presences cannot work for that scope. What makes mythological the
Myth of the Given is that it “offers exculpations where we wanted
justifications” (McDowell 1994, 8).
The failure of the Myth of the Given in making experience
intelligible as a tribunal is what prompts us to the other side of the
seesaw: Coherentism. This is the position, famously held by Donald
Davidson (see for instance Davidson 1986, 307-319), according to
which if we want to do justice to the distinction between logical
spaces, but still conceiving experience as made up of impressions, we
cannot therefore think of it as a tribunal. Experience cannot stand in
judgment over our empirical thinking, it can only be causally
relevant to a subject's beliefs or judgment, and so we are forced to
renounce the idea of a rational constraint external to our thought.
That is to say, if we do not want to fall in the Myth of the Given, we
must recognize that experience cannot count as a reason to holding a
belief, since “nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except
another belief” (Davidson 1986, 310). In this way, the Coherentist
picture confines ourselves within the sphere of thinking, depriving us
of the very possibility of being in touch with something outside it. As
a result we have a recoil into the Myth of the Given, only to see again
that it cannot help us in making sense of how our judgments bear on
reality.
According to McDowell, to dismantle the oscillation means to
unmask the appearance of a philosophical obligation in occupying
both those positions as illusory. In order to do this, we need a nondualistic picture of the encounter between mind and world. That is,
we should not add a third theory of the relation between mind and
world, but we should be able to find the space for rethinking the place
of mind and thought in nature. As we'll see below, this space is made

122

available by the notion of “second nature”. Through this therapeutic
notion, McDowell aims to show us a way to a position without
theories, but with no need of a theory. It is to be a place where we can
finally be relieved of the philosophical pressure to state one ultimate
thesis that will get everything right, but which never seems to arrive.
This quietistic method is explicitly related to Wittgenstein and to his
idea of the nature of philosophical clarification. Before saying
something about Wittgenstein's idea of clarification and how
McDowell applies it through the notion of second nature, it may be
useful to look at the way he arrives at discussing the humans-animals
divide.
McDowell's way in showing that the Cartesian picture of a
dualism between reason and nature is not compulsory goes through a
rethinking of the interaction between sensibility and rationality. His
working on the Kantian idea of spontaneity commits him to a
position according to which it is essential to our conceptual capacities
that they are already involved in operation of the receptivity.
According to McDowell, avoiding the Myth of the Given, without
denying a normative role for experience, requires us to conceive
experience as conceptual. That is, we must be able to recognize that
conceptual capacities are already drawn on in receptivity, both in the
case of the empirical knowledge and in that of the inner experience,
when we judge about our own perception, thoughts, sensations and
the like. That experience is conceptual means that conceptual
capacities are not exercised on an extra-conceptual deliverance of
receptivity. At the same time, to say that experience is conceptual
doesn't mean that we create it. McDowell admits that “because
experience is passive, the involvement of conceptual capacities in
experience does not by itself provide a good fit for the idea of a faculty
of spontaneity”, but the crucial point is that:
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How one's experience represents things to be is not under
one's control, but it is up to one whether one accepts the
appearance or rejects it. Moreover, even if one considers
judgments that register experience itself, which are
already active in that minimal sense, we must
acknowledge that the capacity to use concepts in those
judgments is not self-standing; it cannot be in place
independently of a capacity to use the same concepts
outside that context (McDowell 1994, 10-11).
This means that we are able to judge, for example, that something is
red only because we are already able to move into the space of
reasons, because we have a “background understanding that includes,
for instance, the concept of visible surface of objects and the concept
of suitable conditions for telling what color something is by looking at
it” (McDowell 1994, 12). In the case of perception, McDowell's claim
that the content of experience is conceptual amounts to the claim that
perceptual episodes occurring in a human life are of a kind such that
they must themselves be understood in terms that imply the power to
reason about the relevance of such episodes to that life itself. This is
the way experience (and perception, as an important aspect of the
human condition) matters to us, the way we are open to the world.
I think that to understand this point is a good way to make sense
of, or give content to, the idea of second nature. McDowell introduces
this notion in order to make available a perspective from which we
are not forced anymore to see our rationality as detached from our
animal being. This is intended as the quietistic achievement of a
position from which we can look at reason in terms of something
natural. The notion of a human second nature, understood as a nontheoretical notion, is the reconciling reminder that we are animals
whose natural being is permeated and transformed through and
through by rationality. McDowell explains this point as follows:
Human beings are intelligibly initiated into […] the space
of reasons by [an] upbringing, which instills the
appropriate shape into their lives. The resulting habits of
thought and action are second nature (McDowell 1994,
84).
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This means that through the idea of second nature, we can say that
our rationality is part of (our) nature, and that our nature is the way
it is because of a special relation between the biological features or
potentialities we were born with and our upbringing, or Bildung. This
special relation connecting what we may call our first and our second
nature is, again, not to be understood as the exercise of conceptual
capacities on an extra-conceptual Given; the relation is a
transformative1 one, in which what we perceive (and desire, feel, or
experience in general) is already and inextricably informed by the
presence of language, culture, and rationality. In a word, we have
inherited a tradition.
So it is not that we share the same perceptual system with
animals, on which rationality simply sit atop. In McDowell's
terminology, this would amounts to have a “highest common factor”
conception of perception (McDowell 1994, 113), which is a version of
the Myth of the Given. In appealing to second nature we are able to
spell out and make intelligible what is unique about human beings as
opposed to other animals, the difference between us and them, by
reminding ourselves that our nature is rational in that peculiar way.
We have so far seen that in Mind and World the discussion
about humans and animals is introduced as an illustration of an idea
of conceptuality that could resist a conception of mind and
experience informed by the mythology of the Giveness. We have also
seen that to speak as McDowell does of the difference between
humans and animals means that the distinction at issue points to a
diversity in kind concerning what we take to be unique about the
human condition. What I think McDowell is urging us to recognize is
that the difference between us and them is embedded in the realm of
meaning, that it is a conceptual distinction and not something we
discover through empirical observations. But what is the point of
saying that the notion of the difference is embedded in the realm of
meaning? And where we should look at to see in a perspicuous way
the conceptual connections that we inherited as constitutive of our
Bildung and that articulate the idea of this difference? I think that a
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good answer to these questions may come from the acknowledgement
of the importance of the starting point for philosophical reflection on
humans and animals.
I want to quote a passage from Cora Diamond's paper Eating
Meat, Eating People:
The difference between human beings and animals is not
to be discovered by studies of Washoe or the activities of
dolphins. It is not that sort of study or ethology or
evolutionary theory that is going to tell us the difference
between us and animals: the difference is […] a central
concept for human life and is more an object of
contemplation than observation […]. One source of
confusion here is that we fail to distinguish between ‘the
difference between animals and people’ and ‘the
differences between animals and people’. […] In the case
of the difference between animals and people, it is clear
that we form the idea of this difference, create the concept
of the difference, knowing perfectly well the
overwhelmingly obvious similarities (Diamond 1991, 324).
Diamond is saying that any discovery of similarities between humans
and animals with respect to properties or capacities that we might
have previously considered as necessary conditions for being a
person (such as the capacity to communicate) could not diminish our
sense of the difference between us and them. Her point is against
such authors as Singer and Regan who think that any appeal to a
fundamental difference between human beings and animals amounts
to a form of speciesism. In maintaining the difference, both
Diamond's and McDowell's discussions could be read as a radical
criticism of those theoretical positions that debunk the importance in
ethics of the concept of human being. But I'll be not concerned with
this criticism here. Instead, I want to focus on what distinguishes
McDowell's and Diamond's accounts of human specialness.
McDowell's interest in the humans-animals divide is prompted
by the threat of a certain intellectual embarrassment on the subject of
animals; since his picture of our being open to the world is a
consequence of our ability to engage in the conceptually articulated
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thought that records how things are in that world – that is, a
consequence of the operation of the faculty of spontaneity – he is led
to an austere position about other animals' mindedness. For, if “the
objective world is present only to a self-conscious subject's ability to
ascribe experiences to herself” and “it is the spontaneity of the
understanding, the power of conceptual thinking, that brings both the
world and the self into view”, it follows that “creatures without
conceptual capacities lack self-consciousness and […] experience of
the objective reality” (McDowell 1994, 114). So, in McDowell's view,
we must recognize that mere animals have only a kind of protosubjectivity, and not the full-fledged subjectivity which is the
exclusive prerogative of human beings. Even if animals are not
Cartesian automata, their life is “structured exclusively by immediate
biological imperatives”, and it is “shaped by goals whose control of
the animal's behavior at a given moment is an immediate outcome of
biological forces” (McDowell 1994, 115).
It seems that McDowell is prompted to speak about animals only
by a theoretical interest in defending his picture of human nature as
essentially second nature against the idea of non-conceptual
experience. He focuses on animal mindedness considering it as
nothing more than a hard-case to test the validity of his picture of
rationality. This argumentative requirement seems to drive him to a
traditional task of constructive philosophy – that of demarcating the
limits of subjectivity – that is at odds with the nature and the purpose
of his own conception of clarification. In fact, for a quietistic account
of rationality and of the humans-animals divide it should be enough
to stop at the point in which we are led to see the intelligibility of a
position outside the oscillation, and that is obtained by picturing
human nature as essentially a second nature.
But in those passages McDowell is shifting his perspective,
making a non innocent move from a therapeutic use of the notion of
second nature to what might seem the basis of a substantive
philosophical thesis about human rationality. For one thing is to offer
a reconciling picture of human mindedness pointing to the fact that
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“we have what mere animals have, perceptual sensitivity to features
of our environment, but we have it in a special form” (McDowell
1994, 64), in order to show that it is not compulsory to us to see
human mind as something detached from nature; a different thing is
to say that animal lives are structured exclusively by immediate
biological imperatives, or that they have a proto-subjectivity, and so
on, as the result of a transcendental argument about the distinction
between humans and animals. By tracing in advance the boundaries
of what can be said properly human, McDowell fosters a sense of
strangeness in thinking of reason as part of nature that is at odds
with his own quietistic aspiration. My criticism is thus concerned
with this Kantian inkling in McDowell's exposition, a transcendental
element of a Kant not read after Wittgenstein.
Diamond's way of approaching the idea of a fundamental
difference between human beings and animals is different in its
spirit. She says that:
A difference like that may indeed start out as a biological
difference, but it becomes something for human thought
through being taken up and made something of – by
generation of human beings, in their practices, their art,
their literature, their religion, their ethics. […] It is absurd
to think that these are questions you should try to answer
in some sort of totally general terms, quite independently
of seeing what particular human sense people have
actually made out of the differences or similarities you are
concerned with. And this is not predictable (Diamond
1991, 351).
Again, Diamond is speaking against utilitarian account of animal
ethics. But it is possible to read her words as a correction, or as an
internal or sympathetic criticism of an aspect of McDowell's
Kantianism. From her point of view, the reality of the gulf we may
find in our relations with animals is part of our life with them, and
not the result of a transcendental argument about the powers of the
mind. The reality of the difference lies, for instance, in the fact that
we cannot seriously write a biography of a dog, or in the fact that we
learn the concept of human being also by sitting at a table and eating
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meat. In general, we create the concept of the difference through the
variety of our responses to animal life, and that should be the starting
point for a realistic philosophical account of the human specialness.
So my point is that McDowell's discussion about the difference in
kind between humans and animals fails to be a good illustration of
his own conception of conceptuality. What I take to be a general
worry about McDowell's treatment of human rationality is that he
tends to not being attentive to the details of our conceptual life. He
offers a general account of the encounter of mind and world, and
argues that in the relation between thought and reality the latter is
given conceptually, and that we find our way in the world by being
sensitive to the dictates of reason. But this tends to downplay the
variety of ways we actually make sense of the world, the ways of our
being sensitive to reality.
I want to focus on this point, and conclude with some brief
remarks about McDowell's quietism and his Kantian way of
proceeding. Recently (McDowell 2009a, 256-272 and McDowell
2009b, 308-323) McDowell has modified his view about the sense in
which our sensory capacities are conceptual. The crucial assumption
that McDowell has rejected is that the actualization of conceptual
capacities in experience, which is required for experience to stand
within the space of reasons, means that experience must have a
propositionally articulated conceptual content. Thought of in this
way, experience has a that-structure, such that one can hear that
there is a river ahead or see that there is a book on the desk. What is
distinctive about the propositional content is not just this thatstructure, but that the content which it captures is the same as the
content figuring in judgments or beliefs registering that things are
thus and so. It is this idea that McDowell now questions, rather than
the intuitively plausible notion that we can experience that something
is the case. That is, experience is still conceived as conceptual, but
now McDowell acknowledges a more complex idea of what it means
for us to have an experience and, related to this, that the exercise of
our conceptual capacities is not reducible to mere judge-making. For
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if experience, on which judgments are made, has a conceptual shape,
which particular conceptual shape does it have? In order to answer to
this question, we should look at the actual experiences we may have
in particular situations. This is the reason why McDowell now grants
that experience is not always discursively conceptually shaped. This
picture of conceptuality requires a look and see strategy that is able to
show the articulation of the meanings we are responsive to. In the
case of our idea of a human specialness, this, again, would amount to
answer to the question “what human beings have made of the
difference between human beings and animals?” (Diamond 1991,
350).
In the light of this reminder, it is possible to state the kind of
criticism I proposed by saying that McDowell does not give content to
the idea that the humans-animals divide may be something deeply
rooted in our life, and that's because it takes it to be just an hard case
to test the validity of his own answer to the Big Question about the
general encounter of mind and world.
This point about the big philosophical questions brings us to the
issue of philosophical clarification, as Wittgenstein understood it. In
her paper Criss-Cross Philosophy, Diamond is concerned with
Wittgenstein's criticism of his early conception of philosophical
method. Diamond characterizes the difference between
Wittgenstein's early and later method as one regarding the ability to
practice philosophical clarifications “not in the shadow of a big
question”. From Wittgenstein's later point of view, the Tractatus
presents a piecemeal approach to philosophical problems which is
still guided by the idea that in philosophy we face fundamental
problems, as the one about the essence of proposition. As Diamond
says:
[In the Tractatus] the search for the essence of language
is, in theory, überwunden, overcome. But it is really still
with us, in an ultimately unsatisfactory, unsatisfying,
conception of what it is to clarify what we say (Diamond
2004, 207).
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In order to escape the big questions, it is important to see philosophy
as made up of particular problems. The Investigations show us the
possibility of a piecemeal method that face philosophical problems as
standing on their own. And it accomplishes this task, for instance, by
offering different kinds of language games, that is, imagining
particular and concrete situations. This is part of the reason why in
Wittgenstein's writings we cannot find anything like this: Since
beliefs are intelligible only as situated in the weave of our life, it is a
mistake to think of a dog as having any.
In this paper I tried to present McDowell's account of human
specialness in terms of a fundamental difference between humans
and animals. I also tried to show that the concept of that difference is
relevant for a Wittgensteinian understanding of the place of
rationality in nature. I then developed an internal criticism of
McDowell's transcendental way of approaching this topic by using
Diamond's insights about the importance of the details for a realistic
philosophical account of human mindedness. My aim was to show
that the difference between humans and animals, between us and
them, is constitutive of our understanding of what it means to be
humans, but this is not something we can explain in advance of
looking at the weave of our life with them.

Notes
1. I took this label from an unpublished text by James Conant.
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